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TAKING A BREAK FROM ACRIMONY: THE FEMINIST




In this Essay, written as part of a symposium honoring the work of
Professor Ann Scales, Professor Katherine Franke explores how Profes-
sor Scales may have approached the cutting edge problem of same-sex
couples divorcing. Professor Scales's work evidenced a deep commit-
ment to the twin projects of recognizing structural gender disadvantage
suffered by women and the tyranny of gender stereotypes. This Essay
speculates that Professor Scales's feminist commitments would be unset-
tled by the application to divorcing same-sex couples of rules and norms
of divorce forged in the heterosexual context where gender inequality set
the parameters of justice. Indeed, Franke speculates that Scales would
share her concern about the potential for divorce law to heterosexualize
same-sex couples by slotting them into familiar social roles of husbands
and wives. The problem of gendering lesbian husbands and gay wives
ought to be a serious subject of feminist critique and is amenable to the
feminist analysis Professor Scales left us in her written work.
t Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Gender and
Sexuality Law, Columbia Law School. © 2013 by Katherine Franke. This Essay derived from the
keynote address I provided at the Symposium at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law in
honor of Professor Ann Scales and her work. I thank Nancy Ehrenreich for this kind invitation to
contribute to such an important tribute to Professor Scales's work. Thanks to Fred Hertz for many
conversations about the complexities of folding same-sex couples into the domain of civil marriage.
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Ann Scales left us too soon. As others have mentioned in this Sym-
posium held in her honor, Ann was one of the founding mothers of femi-
nist jurisprudence-it may be that she even invented the term itself.1 She
left us a rich legacy of work, cut short by her untimely death. In fact, I
am at pains to note that 2012 was a year too full of losses in feminist
legal theory and activism. Besides Professor Scales, we lost Jane Larson
at the University of Wisconsin, Katherine Darmer at Chapman Universi-
ty, and Paula Ettelbrick who had taught at Barnard College, New York
University, and the University of Michigan. Like Professor Scales, Pro-
fessors Larson, Darmer, and Ettelbrick passed away tragically, far too
early, and were among the nation's leaders in generating a body of
scholarship that was nuanced in its explicitly feminist ambitions and the-
oretically sophisticated in its method.2
When Professor Scales returned to the academy in 2003, having
taken a five-year hiatus from a highly successful career as a law profes-
sor, she openly lamented the direction and tone that much feminist legal
scholarship had taken.3 She expressed nostalgia for the early days when
an explicitly feminist analysis of law and social disadvantage was being
forged in the 1980s. This is how she put it:
I... was a ground-floor participant in what came to be known as
"feminist jurisprudence,".... As more voices joined the debate, it
got pretty raucous. Even though there were sharp disagreements and
discomforts, those were heady days. Most of the feminist jurisprudes
knew one another, talked with one another, and kept track of one an-
other's work....
.... Upon my return to the academy, it seemed to me that much of
feminist jurisprudence had gone missing at the same time that I had
gone missing. Before my disappearance, I was already a bit grumpy
about what I regarded as the encroaching domestication of feminist
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (9th ed. 2009) (referencing Professor Ann Scales as
authoring the first publication to use the phrase "feminist jurisprudence").
2. See, e.g., M. Katherine Baird Darmer, "Immutability" and Stigma: Towards a More
Progressive Equal Protection Rights Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 439 (2010);
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK: NAT'L GAY &
LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, 14; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay
Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107 (1996); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?: The Need to
Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513 (1993); Jane E. Larson,
"Even a Worm Will Turn at Last ": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1 (1997); Jane E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 997 (1992); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'De-
ceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993).
3. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 2-3
(2006).
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legal theory, the dulling of some of the sharpest edges. Sure enough,
as of my reentry, I discovered that we were in a "postfeminist" age.
4
In fact, it was Janet Halley's invitation that we "take a break from
feminism" that really put Ann over the edge.5 I remember attending a
conference on women and the law at the University of Texas in 2003
when Janet floated the notion of "tak[ing] a break," to the shock, if not
outrage, of many of the participants.6 Ann was among them, and I recall
her reaction-fury, really-that somehow feminism had accomplished
enough politically and institutionally that it was something from which
we could productively take a break. But what I recall even more vividly
were the women of color in the room who, for the most part, taught at
public universities in the South, and who felt that Janet's invitation ig-
nored the unequal distribution of the fruits of feminism across regions,
classes, and races in the United States. When they spoke on the panel
that followed Janet's they were indignant, but more than that, they were
hurt. I sat next to a woman in the audience who was in tears, weeping at
how invisible Janet's talk made her feel-as a woman, as a woman of
color, and as a law professor working at a school where neither she nor
her students enjoyed the privileges and riches of Harvard.
I recall Ann standing in the back of the room, arms crossed and
brow furrowed, more apprehensive about the state of the field than as-
saulted personally by the suggestion that we had entered a time when we
could and should move beyond feminism.
I recount this story to emphasize aspects of Ann's work-including
her writing, her teaching, and her activism-that I think distinguished her
in important ways from many of our peers. The first is how deeply com-
mitted Ann was not only to ideas, but also to ideas that had traction in the
world. She insisted over and over in her work that theory must join hands
with practice and that the two need to inform one another.7 Making ideas
do real work is difficult, but it's what she aimed for in all her work.
Second, she lamented the divisions within feminist legal theory and
the ways in which we fought with one another on the page. She was a
scholar who was at once quite radical in her politics8 and other-regarding
4. Id. at 1, 3 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,
56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence
as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989)).
5. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
(2006).
6. See Janet Halley, Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 197, 224-25 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291,
292-93 (2003); Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 10-11
(1992) [hereinafter Scales, Feminist Legal Method].
8. "[F]eminist legal method can be scary as hell." Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The
Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 36 n. 10 (1997); "[The Senate hearings
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in her ethics.9 Her work took up the ways we could entertain disagree-
ment as feminists on issues in which we have such important and vital
personal stakes. By this, I mean she steered clear of the acrimony that
she felt increasingly characterized feminist legal scholarship after her
return to the academy ten years ago. Strongly influenced by the work of
Catharine MacKinnon, Ann watched how MacKinnon's work was mis-
characterized, parodied, or attacked in ways that personalized the debates
among a community of scholars who no longer saw themselves as some-
how engaged in a joint enterprise.10 In Ann's view, this acrimony dis-
honored the important insights that MacKinnon's work had to offer. So
too she felt it was counterproductive to larger feminist goals such as tak-
ing down patriarchy and women's systematic disadvantage through care-
ful, smart, and grounded analysis of the built-in biases of law and legal
structure.
Rather than take a break from feminism, Ann insisted that we ex-
pand feminism's range. She closed her book Legal Feminism with this:
"Let's explicitly consider and apply the insights of feminist legal theory,
and then get on with all the business at hand."'"
So, taking this demand seriously, I want us to consider how Ann
would have approached a newly emerging domain in American social
and legal life that is ripe for careful feminist analysis but has not, for the
most part, received feminist attention. This domain is that occupied by
newly married same-sex couples.
As more and more same-sex couples legally marry, they find them-
selves governed by a set of rules that allocate rights and responsibilities,
and distribute and redistribute property, in ways that were developed
with heterosexual relationships in mind. Marriage law-and most im-
portantly, feminist reforms to marriage law in the last fifty years-takes
matrimony to be a legal relationship that is fundamentally structured by
gender inequality. The rules of support within marriage and the rules of
distribution upon divorce are designed to take that underlying structural
gender inequality into account. The taken-for-grantedness of this evolu-
tion in the law of marriage and divorce we can chalk up as a victory for
feminist lawyering and advocacy.
As we stand at the precipice of same-sex couples gaining the right
to marry-maybe not in one fell swoop by the Supreme Court this term,
on Clarence Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court] indicated to me that patriarchy is running
scared." Scales, Feminist Legal Method, supra note 7, at I (footnote omitted).
9. When the law must choose among realities, the principle of equality requires that we look
to see whose dignity is most at stake, whose point of view has historically been silenced and is in
danger of being silenced again, and that, in the ordinary case, we choose that point of view as our
interpretation.
Scales, Feminist Legal Method, supra note 7, at 27.
10. This is one of the central, early arguments of her book, SCALES, supra note 3, at 13.
It. Id. at 151.
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but soon-it is worth, if only for a moment, shifting our attention from
gaining the right to marry to the social, legal, and economic consequenc-
es of being married. What will it mean for lesbians and gay men to be
governed by a set of norms that never had them in mind? How might we
anticipate forms of injustice and disadvantage that will ensue when fami-
ly court judges, accustomed to adjudicating the fair dissolution of hetero-
sexual marriages, are faced with applying the law of marriage to couples
whose lives and values may not squeeze easily into the roles of husbands
and wives? Even more so, how might the heterosexual presumptions that
undergird the current law of marriage perversely provide leverage to one
or both parties in divorcing same-sex couples whose position would be
advantaged by exploiting stereotypic and gendered notions of the roles,
vulnerabilities, and powers of husbands and wives?
The project of thinking through marital justice for same-sex couples
should be both queer and feminist in nature and could benefit enormous-
ly from the feminist analysis Ann Scales left us.
Let me offer two examples to illustrate the challenges of applied
feminist theory in this larger context.
First, a few months ago I was invited to give a talk at St. Bartholo-
mew's Episcopal Church on Park Avenue in New York. The church was
founded in 1835 and has a rather affluent membership that is surprisingly
diverse.12 Their lesbian and gay fellowship invited me to talk to them
about the marriage cases that were before the Supreme Court.'3 I don't
get asked to talk at church very often, so I welcomed the opportunity to
reach a new and different audience.
About seventy-five people showed up, including one woman whom
I'll call Beth who lived in New Jersey and came in to mass at St. Bart's
every Sunday. She raised her hand at the end of my talk and shared the
following story:
After divorcing a man fifteen years ago, Beth was set up on a blind
date with a woman-let's call her Ruth-and they dated on and off for
nine years. Beth bought, renovated, and flipped houses and had become
quite successful doing so. Ruth, on the other hand, was a licensed electri-
cian working through the electrician's union. Their relationship was very
volatile, but they wanted to try to figure out how to make it work. There
were some deep issues of conflict-largely having to do with class dif-
ferences and money-that they could not resolve and kept returning to in
their fights. Beth, the more affluent of the two, had two teenage children
from her prior marriage and had primary custody of the kids. Three years
ago Beth and Ruth reunited after having broken up for about nine
12. See St. Bart's, http://www.stbarts.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183
(2010).
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months, and they went to a counselor to set out some ground rules about
their separate and joint financial lives. Together with the counselor they
agreed not to commingle their assets but to live together and jointly con-
tribute to their daily living expenses. Their contributions would not be
the same, as Beth would contribute 80% and Ruth 20%. They both
agreed in front of the counselor to the terms of the financial arrangement,
hoping that this would minimize future conflict in the relationship.
Not surprisingly, it didn't. Beth then told me that they did some-
thing that really surprised me: "We decided to get married in Massachu-
setts." As Beth explained it to me later:
We just thought that getting married would allow us to work things
out without the threat of breaking up. We both thought it would make
us feel safer to work through the hard stuff if we had the legal struc-
ture of marriage around our relationship. I don't know what I was
thinking; it's like people deciding that having a baby will help keep
them together. 14
Fifteen months later they had a terrible fight and Ruth moved out.
Beth then filed for divorce and Ruth's lawyer demanded her equitable
half share of all of Beth's assets, as well as ongoing support. They never
put their premarital financial agreement in writing, but the counselor
with whom they worked out the agreement estified in the trial to its de-
tails.
Here's how the judge ruled: 15
- She ignored the prenuptial agreement because it wasn't in writ-
ing, and under New Jersey law a prenuptial financial agreement must be
in writing.' 
6
* She backdated their marriage to when they started living together
rather than to when they actually legally married, therefore rendering all
of their property accumulated in the six years prior to the marriage mari-
tal property.
- She did not consider the periods in which the two were broken up
and living separately as "breaks in the ongoing relationship" because
Ruth returned to Beth's home a few times a year to visit the kids for
birthdays and holidays, thus evidencing, in the judge's view, an ongoing
relationship.
14. Conversation with Beth, St. Bart's attendee (March 28, 2013).
15. These details are from my conversations with Beth in which she described the judge's
ruling to me.
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-33 (West 2013) ("A premarital or pre-civil union agreement shall
be in writing, with a statement of assets annexed thereto, signed by both parties, and it is enforceable
without consideration.").
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* She found that during a yearlong period when Ruth wasn't able to
get work, Ruth stayed home and took care of the kids and did other un-
remunerated housework, which amounted to her contribution to the fami-
ly's well-being.
* She treated all of Beth's assets as marital property and granted
Ruth a half share in all of it.
Beth and I have talked quite a bit since the meeting at St. Bart's,
and I have gotten a pretty good sense of what she's going through. She
is, as you might imagine, outraged that the laws of equitable distribution
applied to their divorce even though they agreed otherwise. "I want my
experience to be a cautionary tale for others-gay people should be wary
of marriage," she told me. "You have no idea what you're getting your-
self into."
So here are a few things to think about as feminists when consider-
ing this case: Beth's perspective reflects what I've come to call the "les-
bian husband" position. She feels like she earned her own money fair and
square, not due to any gender-based advantage that a male husband mar-
ried to a female wife might have. Ruth should not have any legal entitle-
ment to her money; in fact, Ruth agreed not to make such a claim before
they got married. In so many ways, Beth's position is not unfamiliar in
divorce cases-it's the husband position, seeking to minimize financial
exposure in a divorce from a wife who has lower wage-labor market
power and trying to limit that exposure through a prenuptial agreement.
On the other hand, Ruth looks a lot like a "lesbian wife"-going in
and out of the wage-labor market, earning less money, and contributing
less financially to the family's joint support. The court even understood
her to be a "housewife" for part of their marriage, performing unpaid
domestic labor with which family court judges and divorce law are quite
familiar. On this view, Beth should not be able to just walk away from
Ruth, leaving her destitute while Beth retains all of her substantial assets.
Given that same-sex couples were not able to marry at the point that Beth
and Ruth got together, it is only fair and just that the judge backdate the
marriage to early in their relationship on the notion that they would have
married if they could have. In this sense, the shadow of the law of mar-
riage17 is cast backward as a kind of restitution for a status injury the
couple faced, having been barred from marrying for much of their rela-
tionship.
17. Ariela Dubler has updated Mnookin and Kornhauser's work on the shadow of marriage in
ways that might inform the equities of the illustrative cases I offer in this essay. Compare Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Komhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing how marriage laws affect bargaining powers with respect to di-
vorcing couples), with Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003) (discussing how women out-
side of the institution of marriage have been legally defined by marriage laws).
2013]
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On this telling, Beth and Ruth's case looks a lot like a traditional
heterosexual divorce-the husband, the one with more assets, trying to
part with as few of those assets as possible, and the wife, the one with
fewer resources, trying to gain as capacious an interpretation of equitable
distribution as possible.
Let me offer another story-a briefer one, but one that illuminates
another way in which marriage law "unmodified" (to borrow Catharine
MacKinnon's term ) may not be up to delivering justice in the contextof same-sex couples divorcing.
A friend of mine practices family law in the Bay Area and has been
doing so for years-since long before same-sex marriage or civil unions.
He tells me that he's seeing a trend emerging in a number of the gay-
male divorces he has handled. Where the two men in the couple have
different earning power or assets, the less affluent spouse is declining to
demand his half share at the time of divorce because it genders him as a
wife to do so. He would rather leave the marriage with his masculinity
intact than be turned into an ex-wife receiving alimony. For gay men in
this situation, the fear of marriage law gendering them motivates them to
forgo economic advantage. This dynamic contrasts with my first example
where the gendering of the weaker party provides her with an economic
advantage she is more than happy to seize.
With the guys, just as with the women, the law of marriage and di-
vorce imposes-if not imprints-status-based and gendered identities on
the parties in ways that clearly change how they might have seen them-
selves had marriage law not been on the scene. The desirability of these
identities may cut in opposite directions depending upon whether mascu-
linity or femininity is at issue.
The new world we live in, one in which lesbian and gay couples are
increasingly marrying, holds out two different ways of thinking about the
subversive feminist potential of this important change in the law.
We could see the revolutionary project as disassociating gender
from sex. That is to say, we could entertain the notion that women can be
husbands and men can be wives. That's pretty "gender-y" as Eve Sedg-
wick once said.19 I suspect that that project would not satisfy a feminist
like Ann Scales. She would want to do more.
The lesbian-husbands and gay-wives analysis surfaces and illumi-
nates gender differences and advantages that are quite familiar in mar-
riage and in society more generally. Yet this account ratifies marriage as
18. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987).
19. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Gosh, Boy George, You Must be Awfully Secure in Your
Masculinity! ", in CONSTRUCTING MASCULINITY 11, 16 (Maurice Berger et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis
omitted).
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essentially a status-based relationship populated by stock characters
locked into roles that predetermine their relative rights and responsibili-
ties, and powers and vulnerabilities. It risks turning back the modem
reconceptualization of marriage as more contract than status.
Is there any way in which we might, as feminists, be inclined to re-
sist the application of a traditional heterosexual frame of reference for
these cases? Queer theory has certainly been up to this project for some
time.20 But what might a feminist critique contribute? Need we take a
break from feminism to appreciate the risks of returning to good old-
fashioned status when analyzing a marriage like Beth and Ruth's or the
gay-male divorces I described?
It can't be that the only way that power inequalities in marriage can
become legible to family court judges is through the epistemic violence
of casting them in familiar gendered roles that have already been scripted
by traditional notions of marriage. What if we were to see this as an op-
portunity to disorganize marriage and gender altogether? By this I mean,
what if the increasingly common phenomenon of same-sex spouses had
the effect of blowing up the very notion of roles in marriage completely?
Let's turn to Ann's work to see if it can help. Her brand of femi-
nism, as she described it, is "concrete, antiessentialist, . . . instrumental,
eclectic, and open-minded.",21 Concrete insofar as it grows out of real
experiences of subordination caused by gender-based hierarchies. An-
tiessentialist in that it is not tied to any foundational moral principle.
Instrumental to the extent that law should not be understood to be "a
fixed mirror of human rationality, 22 but must always be used to address
human needs and ends. And eclectic to the extent that we have to be
open to revising our "beliefs and strategies when necessary because ex-
perience is too complex to be captured by" adherence to any rigid ap-
proach. 23
Given these precepts, as applied to the challenges of rights and re-
sponsibilities in same-sex marriages, one might be inclined to reject the
return to status through the translation of lesbian and gay relationships
into the vernacular of legal marriage. Instead, let's start with the concrete
contexts and values of lesbian and gay relationships that have evolved
before marriage was ever a reasonable possibility. Outside the structure
of marriage law, same-sex couples were not strangers to the notion of
interdependency, commitment, and care. Rather we forged what many
self-consciously understood to be alternatives to the off-the-shelf, gen-
dered binary of marriage, and we constructed webs of care and commit-
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICSOF QUEER LIFE vii (1999).
21. SCALES, supra note 3, at 8.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 9.
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ment that were not necessarily bound by erotic attachment. So too, we
created erotic attachments that did not necessarily entail care or com-
mitment. Perhaps most importantly we elaborated loving, caring selves
in contexts that were not principally structured by gender inequality.
Unleashed from the preordained roles of husband and wife, gender
turned up in lesbian relationships, if it turned up at all, in often unpre-
dictable, fluid, and interesting ways. It could be used like a lash ("stop
acting like a man") or as a repertoire of erotic exchange, such as in
butch/femme role-play or the familiar description of someone as "butch
in the streets, femme in the sheets." What you saw on the outside wasn't
necessarily what you got on the inside. Of course this is true of men and
women in straight relationships as well, but with lesbians, gender-
however fluid-has been less likely to produce structural inequalities in
the same way that it has with heterosexual couples.
I think Ann would urge us to reject the translation of lesbian spous-
es into essentialized husbands and wives, and instead use the presence of
same-sex couples in marriage as a productive opportunity to further de-
essentialize marriage tout court. Rather than turning to familiar tropes, I
think she'd prefer a more functional approach to the assignment of rights
and responsibilities at the point of lesbian divorce. Rather than asking
whether they functioned like a married couple and then marrying them
retroactively, the court should attempt an inquiry into how their relation-
ship functioned. What kind of commitment had they made to one anoth-
er, and how can the law of marriage reflect and value what lay at the
heart of the relationship when it was working well? These are feminist
values that do not merely come to the rescue of women who occupy sub-
ordinate positions relative to men, but that resist the essentialization of
women as always already the weaker party. In this sense I think that
when it comes to same-sex divorces we need to abandon the structural
approach that most judges bring to heterosexual divorce cases-a struc-
ture many feminists have urged them to take,24 but one that can only un-
derstand inequalities between the parties as necessarily the product of
gender-based power.
Disorganizing gender roles in marriage may help transform the way
that so many wives seem to surrender all manner of self-sovereignty in
marriage, starting with "taking" their husbands' names, to "letting" their
husbands do most if not all of the driving, to the way that marriage as an
economic unit tends to incentivize the making of "choices" that render
one party-typically the wife-more economically vulnerable (such as
not investing in her career, working part-time or not at all, or moving for
his job).
24. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Para-
dox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 79, 171 (1989).
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This could be the kind of project Ann might have had in mind when
she insisted that we bring "concrete, antiessentialist, instrumental, . . .
eclectic, and open-minded" feminism to bear on the business at handy.
Like you, I'm just heartbroken that she can't be here to help us think it
through, because I, for one, cannot figure it all out on my own.
25. Id. at 8.
2013]
